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Combating Midnight Regulation 
Jack M. Beermann∗
 
The flurry of regulatory activity by the outgoing administration of President George W. 
Bush has raised, once again, the specter of midnight regulation.1  In contrast to the late-
term action of the Clinton administration, much of this administration’s late-term action 
seems to be more de-regulatory than regulatory, but from a political and legal standpoint, 
that distinction may not make much, if any, difference.2  While midnight regulation 
provokes an instinctively negative reaction, it is not completely clear what is wrong with 
it.  This uncertainty arises in part because of the different reasons for midnight regulation.  
In my earlier work on this subject, I identified four possible reasons for late-term action, 
and in this article I add a fifth, although I confess lack of knowledge on whether this fifth 
reason is a significant factor in midnight regulation.  The original four from my earlier 
work are 1) the natural human tendency to work to deadline, which has been referred to 
in the literature as the “Cinderella constraint”3; 2) hurrying to take as much action as 
possible near the end of the term to project the administration’s agenda into the future; 3) 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  
beermann@bu.edu.  This is a preliminary draft that should not be quoted or cited without permission.  © 
2009, Jack M. Beermann, all rights reserved.  Thanks to Gary Lawson and William P. Marshall for helpful 
discussion of the ideas in this article. 
1 “Midnight regulation” is loosely defined as late-term action by an outgoing administration.  There are 
many types of midnight regulation and many reasons why the volume of administrative action tends to 
increase near the end of an administration.  For a detailed look at the phenomenon, see Jack M. Beermann, 
Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U.L. Rev. 947 (2003). 
2 I plan to investigate whether there are important legal or political differences between midnight regulation 
and midnight deregulation in a future article, tentatively titled “Midnight Deregulation.”  That article will 
examine the late-term regulatory actions taken by the G.W. Bush administration and analyze whether late-
term deregulatory actions should be understood or treated differently from late-term regulatory actions. 
3 See Jay Cochran III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase Significantly during Post-
Election Quarters, (working paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University 2001) (copy on file with 
author). 
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waiting to take potentially controversial action until the end of the term when the political 
consequences are likely to be muted and  4) delay by some external force that prevented 
the administration from taking desired action until late in the term.  The fifth and new, 
possible reason for late-term action I call “timing.”  Timing is a form of waiting but not 
because of potential negative consequences but rather to do something positive before the 
presidential election to help one’s own reelection bid or the election prospects of the 
incumbent party.  One can imagine, for example, the President delivering an October 
surprise of favorable regulatory action for the automobile industry if Michigan looks like 
a swing state in the upcoming election. 
 
Whatever the reason for midnight regulation, there seems to be a general consensus that 
something has gone wrong when an outgoing administration takes important action while 
the incoming administration is essentially waiting to take over.  Most late term action is 
subject to the obvious question of “if this action was so important, why didn’t the 
administration take it in the last seven and three-quarters years or so?”  The normative 
critique of midnight regulation is fairly obvious from each of the reasons posited for why 
the phenomenon exists.  Even though the Constitution leaves the incumbent in office for 
approximately eleven weeks after election day, we feel uncomfortable when an outgoing 
administration waits until late in the term to take politically controversial action or loads 
up on late term actions to project its policy preferences in the future. 
 
I want to highlight one of the problems with midnight regulation that may not be 
completely obvious.  Especially as our collective experience with midnight regulation has 
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grown, the outgoing President knows that the incoming administration is likely to look 
carefully at late term actions by the outgoing administration.  President George W. Bush 
certainly had plenty of experience with the time and energy it took for his administration 
to freeze and then review dozens of late-term actions taken by the Clinton 
administration.4  Some late-term action is so likely to be overturned by the incoming 
administration that the outgoing administration may have acted merely to embarrass the 
new President or force the new President to expend political capital on the matter.  Before 
they act, outgoing administrations should take into account the distraction and energy that 
reviewing late-term actions will take.  The President takes an oath to “faithfully execute 
the office of President of the United States,”5 and it arguably violates that oath if the 
outgoing President contributes to overloading the incoming administration with midnight 
rules and other late-term action to such an extent that it impedes the incoming President’s 
ability to “take care that that the laws be faithfully executed.”6
 
This article examines possible ways to combat midnight regulation, beginning with a 
recent proposal in Congress to restrict rulemaking activity during the last 90 days of an 
outgoing administration by giving the incoming administration the power to “disapprove” 
of regulations adopted in the final 90 days of a President’s term.  The first part of the 
article explains the bill and identifies problems with it.  The second part of the article 
offers two alternative approaches, one involving a simple reform to administrative law 
                                                 
4 See Beermann, supra note x at 949 n.6 (discussing Card memorandum issued by Andrew Card, White 
House Chief of Staff for the first five years of the administration of President George W. Bush, which 
suspended the effectiveness of some of the midnight rules of the Clinton administration). 
5 U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1. 
6 See U.S. Const. Art. II § 3; Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of 
Presidential Transitions, 84 North Carolina L. Rev. 1253 (2006) 
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and another outlining statutory proposals different from the bill proposed by 
Representative Nadler. 
 
I. Representative Nadler’s Proposal 
 
On January 6, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York introduced H.R. 34.  
This bill, the text of which is reproduced in the margin,7 provides simply that “a midnight 
                                                 
7 111th CONGRESS 
1st Session 
H. R. 34 
To delay the implementation of agency rules adopted within the final 90 days of the final term a President 
serves.  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
January 6, 2009 
Mr. NADLER of New York introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary  
 
A BILL 
To delay the implementation of agency rules adopted within the final 90 days of the final term a President 
serves.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the `Midnight Rule Act'. 
SEC. 2. RESTRICTIONS ON MIDNIGHT RULEMAKING. 
Title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 555 the following new section: 
`Sec. 555a. Restrictions on midnight rulemaking 
`(a) Rules Adopted in the Final 90 Days of a Presidential Administration- Notwithstanding section 801, a 
midnight rule shall not take effect until 90 days after the agency head is appointed by the new President. 
`(b) Presidential Authority- 
`(1) NOTICE- Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a midnight rule that would not take 
effect by reason of subsection (a) may take effect if the President serving his final term makes a 
determination under paragraph (2) and submits written notice of such determination to the Congress. 
`(2) EXCEPTIONS- A determination under this paragraph is a determination made by the President by 
Executive Order that the midnight rule should take effect because such rule is-- 
`(A) necessary because of an imminent threat to health or safety or other emergency; 
`(B) necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws; 
`(C) necessary for national security; or 
`(D) issued pursuant to any statute implementing an international trade agreement. 
`(3) EFFECT ON CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL PROCEDURES- An exercise by the President of 
the authority under this subsection shall have no effect on congressional disapproval procedures under 
section 802 or congressional review under section 801. 
`(c) Disapproval by a New Agency Head- 
`(1) DISAPPROVAL- The agency head appointed by the new President may disapprove of a midnight rule 
no later than 90 days after being appointed. 
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rule [“adopted in the last 90 days of a Presidential Administration”] shall not take effect 
until 90 days after the agency head is appointed by the new President.”  The bill would 
also allow the incoming agency head to “disapprove of a midnight rule” within 90 days 
of being appointed. 
 
Regardless of what one thinks about the desirability of accomplishing the bill’s goals, the 
bill as written suffers from numerous flaws, a few of which I will detail.  First, it is 
necessary to explain how the bill would operate.  As noted, the fundamental provision of 
the bill is that no rule adopted in the final 90 days of an outgoing administration (a 
“midnight rule”) can go into effect until 90 days after the appointment of a new agency 
head by the new President.  The newly appointed agency head may, during his or her first 
90 days in office, disapprove of a midnight rule by publishing notice of disapproval in the 
Federal Register and providing notice of disapproval to “the congressional committees of 
jurisdiction.”  If the new agency head takes no action, the midnight rule goes into effect. 
 
The bill would allow the outgoing President, by Executive Order, to put a midnight rule 
into effect, by declaring in an Executive Order that the rule is necessary because of “an 
imminent threat to health or safety or other emergency; necessary for the enforcement of 
                                                                                                                                                 
`(2) PROCEDURE- The agency head appointed by the new President may disapprove a midnight rule by 
publishing a statement of disapproval in the Federal Register and sending a notice of disapproval to the 
congressional committees of jurisdiction. 
`(d) Definitions- The term `midnight rule' means a rule adopted by an agency within the final 90 days a 
President serves in office.'. 
SEC. 3. CLERICAL AMENDMENT. 
The table of contents of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item 
relating to section 555 the following new item: 
`555a. Midnight rulemaking.'. 
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any rule adopted on or after October 22, 2008. 
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criminal laws; necessary for national security; or was issued pursuant to a statute 
implementing an international trade agreement.”  The President must submit written 
notice of this determination to Congress.  (This provision is copied verbatim from the 
Congressional Review Act8 except for the addition of the requirement that the President 
act by Executive Order.)  The bill also provides that the outgoing President’s 
determination that a midnight rule should go into effect does not deprive Congress of its 
authority to reject a rule under the Congressional Review Act.  The bill further provides 
that it applies retroactively to all rules issued after October 22, 2008, which is 90 days 
before President Barack Obama’s inauguration. 
 
Even a cursory reading of the bill reveals that it has some relatively serious drafting 
problems.  I focus on a few of the operational issues that make the bill a less than ideal 
solution to the midnight regulation problem. 
 
The first problem is that the bill delays the effective date of all rules adopted in the last 90 
days of an outgoing administration until 90 days after the appointment of a new agency 
head, whether the incoming administration is of the same party or whether the incoming 
administration would rather have the midnight rules go into effect.   There is no provision 
for allowing an incoming President to allow all or some midnight rules to go into effect 
immediately.  The bill grants only the outgoing President the authority to place midnight 
rules directly into effect.  In some circumstances, and perhaps especially in times of crisis 
when quick and decisive action is necessary, incoming and outgoing administrations may 
                                                 
8 5 U.S.C. §§ 801 et. Seq. 
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work together to take action without regard to the election and inauguration cycle and no 
one wants the delay imposed by the bill. 
 
The blanket delay of midnight rules may not be as politically beneficial to the incoming 
President as it may appear.  There may be instances in which the phenomenon of 
“waiting” until after election day, when a President may act with less regard for the 
political consequences, works to the benefit of the incoming administration.  An outgoing 
President acting responsibly may take difficult action at the end of the term to pave the 
way for a smooth transition; the bill would automatically delay the effective date of rules 
in this category unless the outgoing President uses the authority to advance the effective 
date discussed above.  This would raise the political costs to the outgoing administration 
and thus discourage this sort of cooperative action. 
 
By automatically delaying all midnight rules until the appointment of a new agency head, 
the incoming administration is placed in the potentially uncomfortable position of 
appearing responsible for every rule issued in the last 90 days of the outgoing 
administration.  Newly appointed agency heads may then have to spend their first 90 days 
reviewing midnight rules rather than beginning to work on the new President’s agenda.  
From a different perspective, however, the Nadler bill’s blanket delay of all midnight 
rules may be seen as a virtue.  By automatically delaying all midnight rules, the incoming 
administration can at least delay the day of reckoning until the 90th day after the 
appointment of a new agency head.  If the incoming administration was granted 
discretion to pick and choose among midnight rules to delay, intense pressure may be 
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brought to bear at the very outset of the administration, and the new agency heads may be 
forced to act with great haste in a tense environment.  It is a judgment call whether 
discretion is better or worse than an automatic delay, and for reasons discussed in Part II 
B, in my view the potential benefits of discretion outweigh its potential costs. 
 
Another problem, perhaps less likely to occur, is that the bill could place midnight rules 
into limbo for extended periods of time.  The effective date for midnight rules is 90 days 
after the appointment of a new agency head, during which time the agency head has the 
authority to disapprove the rule.  There is no provision for a holdover agency head, i.e. it 
seems that if the incoming President chooses to keep the outgoing administration’s 
agency head in place, if this bill were in effect, rules issued in the last 90 days of the 
outgoing administration may not go into effect for many months or years.  This may seem 
to be a hyper-technical reading of the bill, but a subject of a midnight rule may have a 
legal argument that the rule has not gone into effect if there is no new agency head.  This 
is obviously an unintended consequence--no one wants to discourage a new President 
from keeping agency heads from the prior administration in office.  A lengthy delay 
could also result if the appointment of a new agency head is delayed because of a 
confirmation problem or if the incoming administration falls behind in naming new 
agency heads.  Of course, if one views midnight rules as virtually always a scourge, then 
the potential for indefinite delay will not be viewed as much of a problem.  But it does 
not seem likely that the author of the bill intended to create the possibility of indefinite 
delays in the effective dates of rules. 
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The only exception in the bill is for rules put into effect through the outgoing President’s 
power to use an Executive Order specifying important reasons for putting a midnight rule 
into effect immediately.  There is no indication that rules required by statutory deadlines 
or court orders are exempt, and there is nothing about rules not subject to APA notice and 
comment procedures.  Is the intent to include personnel rules and rules relating to 
government contracts, grants and benefits, which are completely exempt from APA § 
553?  What about interpretative rules, policy statements and guidance documents that are 
exempt from § 553’s notice and comment provisions?  These issues should be clarified 
before a bill like this is adopted.  As is discussed in more detail below, because exempt 
rules of both types are so easy to revise, midnight rule reform should not apply to them. 
 
The bill also is not very specific about which agencies are subject to it.  Because the bill 
would be inserted into the APA, as 5 U.S.C. § 555a, presumably the APA’s definition of 
“agency” would apply.  This definition is very broad and includes independent agencies 
such as multi-member commissions and the National Labor Relations Board, and the bill 
does not on its face exempt independent agencies from its coverage.  However, the bill is 
not designed for application to independent agencies, and there are good reasons to not 
extend coverage of the bill to independent agencies.  First, the bill does not identify an 
“agency head” for a multi-member agency.  Is it the agency chair, or a majority of the 
agency?  Since new Presidents upon taking office do not normally appoint new agency 
heads for independent agencies, if the bill is construed as applying to such agencies, it 
could force independent agencies to forego issuing rules for the last 90 days of each 
presidential term.  Second, the midnight rule problem is not as serious with regard to 
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independent agencies because they are bi-partisan and because their members serve for 
terms of years that do not coincide with the presidential election cycle.  Out of loyalty to 
the President, independent agencies dominated by the incumbent’s party may time certain 
actions with the political consequences to the President in mind or to avoid rejection by 
the next Congress.  However, because independent agencies are not subject to direct 
supervision by any Executive Branch official, they are less likely than Executive Branch 
agencies to be acting for the reasons that contribute to the general disfavoring of midnight 
rules.  Midnight rule reform is simply not needed for independent agencies. 
 
Another significant problem with the bill is that the incoming administration’s only 
option is to disapprove the midnight rule or allow it to go into effect as written.9  There is 
no option to revise a midnight rule.  This means that if the new agency head concludes 
that some sort of rule is necessary, even one that is very close but not exactly the one 
promulgated by the prior administration, the agency must either accept the imperfect rule 
or engage in an expensive and time consuming rulemaking proceeding to promulgate 
what might be an only slightly different rule.  This can be a real waste given that the 
rulemaking record produced by the prior administration is still pretty fresh and is likely to 
support the rule preferred by the new administration.  The bill could lead either to waste 
or to a new administration allowing a sub-optimal rule to go into effect.               
                                                 
9 The procedure for disapproving a rule contains a quirk that should be abandoned. It provides that the 
agency head disapproving a rule does so by “publishing a statement of disapproval in the Federal Register 
and sending a notice of disapproval to the congressional committees of jurisdiction.”  The problem is with 
the requirement that notice go to the “congressional committees of jurisdiction.”  The agency head should 
be required to send notice to Congress and allow Congress itself to decide which committees should be 
informed.  Agency jurisdiction is a matter of legislative rule which agency heads cannot interpret 
authoritatively.  The agency head could, as a courtesy, send notice to any committee that is known to 
engage in oversight of the particular administrative function, but the effectiveness of the disapproval should 
not depend on the agency making an accurate determination of which committees have jurisdiction over the 
matter in the disapproved rule.   
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There are a few less serious procedural problems with the bill.  Because the bill defines a 
midnight rule as “a rule adopted by an agency within the final 90 days a President serves 
in office,” there are two situations in which it will not be immediately known that a rule 
is a midnight rule.  First, if the President is running for reelection, it will not be known 
until after election day if a rule adopted before Election Day, and less than 90 days before 
January 20, (this year between October 22 and November 4) is a midnight rule.  This is 
not a serious problem, because it throws into uncertainty only rules adopted in the last 
two weeks before election day, and none of these rules will have yet gone into effect 
since no rule’s effective date can be less than 30 or 60 days after adoption, depending on 
whether it is a major rule subject to the Congressional Review Act.  Nonetheless, it seems 
at least odd that an agency can adopt a rule not knowing whether it will go into effect as 
stated in the rule (in as little as 30 days) or not until 90 days after Inauguration Day which 
could amount to a delay of 180 days.  
 
The second situation is less likely to occur but involves the potential for an unexpected 
application of the bill.  If a President dies in office or resigns, under the bill it appears that 
all rules issued in the prior 90 days become midnight rules subject to the bill, which 
would automatically delay their effective date until 90 days after the new President 
(normally the incumbent Vice-President) appoints new agency heads for all agencies that 
had issued rules in the 90 days before the President died or resigned.  This could result in 
180 days of uncertainty even when no one thinks that the prior President had acted for 
any of the reasons we normally attribute to the midnight regulation problem.  Perhaps 
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midnight regulation concerns would exist if a President is in a political fight that appears 
headed for impeachment or resignation (think Illinois Governor Rod Blagoyovich’s 
appointment of Roland Burris to fill Barack Obama’s Senate seat while under indictment 
and subject to impeach proceedings).  Midnight regulation in such circumstances may 
raise eyebrows, but it still does not seem to be likely enough to require reform.  In the 
case of the death of a President while in office, the likelihood that a dying President is 
managing a flurry of midnight regulation in the days before death is so remote that there 
is no good reason to apply midnight rule reform to this situation.  This is all the more true 
given that the new President, being the incumbent Vice-President, is almost certainly of 
the same political party as the prior President and may retain, at least for a time, many of 
the prior President’s agency heads, which would lead to the problem of prolonged delay 
discussed above when no new agency head is appointed. 
 
Another troubling procedural issue is that the bill does not contain a definition of the 
word “adopted.”  What is the precise event that indicates that an agency has adopted a 
rule.  There are several possibilities including publication in the Federal Register, 
submission to the Federal Register for publication, signing a paper indicating that the 
agency has adopted a rule and so on.  Any bill on this subject should make it crystal clear 
what it means for a rule to be “adopted.” 
 
For these reasons and more, the bill proposed by Representative Nadler is not an 
attractive vehicle for midnight rule reform.  However, this does not mean that some form 
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of midnight regulation reform is not desirable or possible to design.  The next section 
proposes two different tacks for such reform. 
 
II. Midnight Regulation Reform Possibilities. 
 
This Part raises two different tacks for dealing with midnight regulation.  The first takes 
on a particular feature of administrative law that makes it difficult for an incoming 
administration to repudiate late-term action by the outgoing administration.  Basically, 
under current doctrine, once a rule goes into effect, any change must be justified by good 
reasons for change even if the original rulemaking record would have justified the result 
put forward as the alternative.  In the context of midnight regulation, this is unfortunate.  
The Supreme Court could loosen up on arbitrary and capricious review in cases involving 
changes to rules in transition periods or more generally soon after the issuance of the 
original rule, or Congress could legislatively provide for more deferential review.  The 
second outlines a statutory model that would grant the incoming administration the power 
to review and reject or modify late-term action by the outgoing administration, similar to 
the model that President George W. Bush’s administration followed when it confronted 
the mass of midnight regulation left behind by the Clinton Administration.  This model is 
not different in principle from the bill proposed by Representative Nadler, but it takes a 
more nuanced approach that is more sensitive to the political and legal realities of 
midnight regulation.  Finally, a simpler approach is raised, which would allow agencies at 
all times to revise or rescind recently issued rules when unexpected negative feedback 
erupts after a rule is issued. 
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This discussion assumes that some sort of reform that would make it easier to combat 
midnight regulation is desirable.  It should be noted that even if it is agreed that midnight 
rules tend to be problematic, it is not completely obvious that reform is necessary.  
Presidents may already have sufficient tools to deal with midnight regulation, as we have 
seen by action taken by the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush to combat the midnight regulatory activity of their respective 
predecessors.  President Bush, for example, suspended the effective date of numerous 
midnight rules to allow his appointees to review and perhaps revise them.  While the 
short duration of a temporary suspension may often preclude resolution of a legal 
challenge while the controversy remains live and justiciable, in a decision involving the 
suspension of a midnight rule by the Bush administration, the D.C. Circuit held that once 
the rule was finalized and published in the Federal Register, in this case on January 22, 
2001, two days after President George W. Bush took office, it took effect and could not 
be suspended or altered without notice and comment.10  Thus, it appears that there is a 
need for reform in the possibly rare situation in which a controversy regarding action 
against midnight rules is subject to legal challenge. 
 
A. Administrative Law Reform 
 
                                                 
10 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004).  This case involved a rule 
regarding the energy efficiency of central air conditioning and heat pumps.  The statutory structure 
underlying this rule caused it to be a particularly tricky midnight rule to deal with because under the statute, 
in what the court called an “anti-backsliding provision,” the agency (Department of Energy) was prohibited 
from ever lowering efficiency standards—new rules could only increase efficiency.  So, once the court held 
that the rule was final and effective when published in the Federal Register, the Department was stuck with 
it.  See id. at 197.
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The outgoing administration of G.W. Bush was careful to shield its late-term output from 
revision by the incoming Obama administration.  Josh Bolten, President Bush’s Chief of 
Staff, issued a memorandum on May 9, 2008, instructing agencies not to propose any 
new rules after June 1, 2008 and to finalize all rules by November 1, 2008.  The Bush 
administration attempted to portray this as taking the high road against midnight 
regulation by avoiding the unseemly specter of rules being published in the Federal 
Register up to and even past Inauguration Day, as had occurred at the end of the Clinton 
Administration, but in truth it was part of an effort to shield its midnight rules from the 
action that it had taken against President Clinton’s midnight rules.  Rules completed more 
than 60 days before Inauguration Day would be final and thus not subject to a freeze or 
easy process of revision by the new administration.  What Bolten was doing was 
providing agencies a roadmap for avoiding what the Bush administration was able to do 
to some of the Clinton administration’s midnight rules. 
 
The Supreme Court’s application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to rescission 
and revision of rules has created some of the difficulties that incoming administrations 
have in trying to undo midnight rules.  Under the Airbags Case, once a rule becomes 
final, rescission or revision must be justified with reference to reasons for the rescission 
or revision even if the original record would have supported a different rule or a decision 
not to adopt any rule.11  This understanding gives an administration a powerful tool, for 
better or for worse, to project its agenda beyond the end of its term. 
 
                                                 
11 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.  Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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Take the Airbags Case as an example.  The Carter Administration’s rule requiring passive 
restraints in passenger cars was promulgated in 1977, the first year of the Carter 
Administration, but it did not require any car to be equipped with passive restraints until 
1982, the second year of the next presidential term.12   This put the Reagan 
Administration in the uncomfortable position of being the first administration to enforce 
this regulation even though it did not agree with the regulation and had actually 
campaigned on a deregulatory platform which was inconsistent with the regulation.  
When the Reagan Administration’s new agency head attempted to rescind the 
requirement, the Court did not ask whether the original rulemaking record would have 
supported a decision to make no rule at all.  Rather, it asked whether there was sufficient 
new evidence or policy reasons for rescinding the rule that had been adopted.  As soon as 
the initial regulation was adopted, it became the baseline for evaluating future agency 
action even though it had not actually gone into effect.13
 
I have argued elsewhere that this application of the arbitrary and capricious standard 
should be reexamined.14  In my view, when a new administration takes office, it should 
have the freedom to revise or rescind rules that were adopted by the prior administration 
if the original rulemaking record would have supported the new administrations decision, 
                                                 
12 See Modified Standard 208, 42 Fed. Reg. 34289 (1977).  There is nothing necessarily nefarious about 
time lines like this—it makes perfect sense in many situations for new rules to be phased, strengthened or 
even weakened over a long period of time, and in this case the automobile manufacturers needed a 
substantial amount of time to prepare for compliance with the rule.  Long lag times can also facilitate the 
exploration of other options.  For example, one feature of the passive restraint rule would have rescinded 
the requirement entirely had two-thirds of states adopted laws requiring auto occupants to wear seatbelts 
within a certain time.  Ultimately, Congress acted to require airbags in all cars, which is more satisfactory 
than agency action from a democratic standpoint. 
13 See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that once 
energy efficiency rules were published in the Federal Register, they could not be altered in way that 
violated statute’s anti-backsliding provision).
14 Beermann, supra note x at 1009-15. 
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at least with regard to rules that can fairly be characterized as midnight regulation.15  The 
baseline should be the statute and regulatory situation before the outgoing administration 
acted.  An objection can be raised that this idea pays insufficient heed to the role of 
agency expertise and makes regulation look overly political, but this objection presumes 
that midnight regulation is less political than the potential reactions of the incoming 
administration.  To the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that a great deal of 
late-term administrative action is political, and that in the rush to deadline even action 
motivated largely by expertise is more likely to contain errors than action taken under 
less time pressure. 
 
Two developments in administrative law lend support to the idea that a different 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to midnight regulation is possible 
within the constraints of the law.  The first is the recent recognition, under the Chevron 
rubric, that agencies are free to reinterpret statutes even when a prior agency 
interpretation has been upheld on judicial review.16  Under step two of the Chevron 
doctrine, which is reached when an agency interprets an ambiguous statute, a court defers 
to any reasonable interpretation.  The Courts decision in the Brand X case17 made clear 
what had been pretty well understood before, that because Chevron step two is a very 
deferential standard of judicial review under which various interpretations might have 
been upheld, agencies are free to alter their interpretations as long as the new 
interpretation is also reasonable.  The baseline against which the new interpretation is 
judged is not the initial interpretation but the statute being interpreted. 
                                                 
15 See id. at 1014. 
16 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 83 (1984). 
17 National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
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The analogy between the two situations is strengthened by the fact that the Supreme 
Court is fully aware that interpretation under Chevron is not simply a quest for the best 
understanding of the meaning of the words Congress used but rather involves choosing 
among plausible interpretations based at least in part on considerations of policy.  The 
Chevron decision recognized this when it stated: 
In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable 
accommodation of manifestly competing interests, and is entitled to deference: 
the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter 
in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling 
conflicting policies.  . . . While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, 
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices -- resolving the competing interests 
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to 
be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of 
everyday realities.18
 
In its Brand X decision, the Court reiterated this understanding: “In Chevron, this Court 
held that ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are 
delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. 
Filling these gaps, the Court explained, involves difficult policy choices that agencies are 
                                                 
18 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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better equipped to make than courts.”19  Thus, the Chevron doctrine, as applied in Brand 
X to allow an agency to adopt a new, reasonable, interpretation, represents an instance of 
policy alteration in which the baseline is the original statute and situation rather than the 
intervening policy that is being repudiated.  There is no apparent reason why an incoming 
administration should not enjoy the same freedom to repudiate the late-term actions of its 
predecessor when the policies involved do not all into the Chevron interpretive 
framework. 
 
Chevron, together with additional instances detailed below, also stands for the 
proposition that the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard can vary with the 
circumstances.  The APA standard of judicial review that applies to agency rules is the 
arbitrary and capricious standard.20  The Chevron opinion paraphrased this standard but 
then constructed what appeared to be a wholly new standard to apply to agency statutory 
interpretation.  Its paraphrase even pointed to the more deferential direction in which it 
was headed.21  In at least two additional situations, the Court has explicitly endorsed a 
more lenient than usual application of the arbitrary and capricious standard based on the 
context of the agency action involved.  In Massachusetts v. EPA,22 the decision rejecting 
the EPA’s refusal to regulate global warming gases, in the course of explaining its 
determination that agency decisions rejecting rulemaking petitions are subject to judicial 
review under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Court quoted with apparent 
                                                 
19 National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
20 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
21 The Chevron Court stated that “legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  467 U.S. at 843.  This is a paraphrase of the 
APA’s “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise contrary to law.”   The Court inserted the 
word “manifestly” apparently in order to provide for deference to agency legal interpretations which does 
not appear to be provided for in the statute as written.
22 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007).  
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approval the D.C. Circuit’s rule that such decisions are reviewed on a very deferential 
standard: “Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though 
such review is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential.’”23
 
This highly deferential version of the arbitrary and capricious review is similar to the 
standard that the Court says applies to review of agency refusals to bring enforcement 
actions (when such refusals are reviewable because governing law contains clear criteria 
for when enforcement is required).  In such cases, the Court has stated that review should 
be very narrow, that the reviewing court should ordinarily look only at the statement of 
reasons the agency has provided for not bringing an enforcement action and that the 
reviewing court should not even consider the factual basis for the decision or facts 
offered in opposition to the decision.24  This is a far cry from the usual practice in cases 
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in which the reviewing court looks 
carefully at the facts and reasoning underlying the decision in what has been denominated 
“hard look” review.25
 
The lesson to be learned from this discussion is that the arbitrary and capricious standard 
is not a static principle that applies uniformly in all contexts.  Rather, the Court has found 
                                                 
23 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) quoting National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Assn 
of America, Inc. v. United States, 883 F. 2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
24 In Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 573 (1975), the Court stated that review of a refusal to initiate 
enforcement action should be very narrow and not ordinarily look at the record beyond the bare reasons 
offered by the agency for not enforcing “The necessity that the reviewing court refrain from substitution of 
its judgment for that of the Secretary thus helps define the permissible scope of review. Except in what 
must be the rare case, the court's review should be confined to examination of the ‘reasons’ statement, and 
the determination whether the statement, without more, evinces that the Secretary's decision is so irrational 
as to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious. Thus, review may not extend to cognizance or trial of 
a complaining member's challenges to the factual bases for the Secretary's conclusion . . .” 
25 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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it appropriate to adjust the scope of review under the statutory standard when it finds a 
different standard more appropriate.  While the Court in the Airbags case rejected the 
argument that review should be relaxed when an agency deregulates, that decision does 
not necessarily entail a rejection of the desirability of an adjustment when an incoming 
administration acts to deal with midnight regulation by its predecessor.  Current law may 
grant too much sanctity to the output of an administration in its death throes, and making 
it easier for an incoming administration to alter late term action may discourage midnight 
regulation in the first place. 
 
In conclusion, although the focus here is on midnight regulation, I should add that my 
proposal for reform should probably not be confined to that problem but rather might be 
extended to increase agency flexibility whenever an agency changes its position shortly 
after issuing a rule.  If an agency issues a rule and the rule causes an outcry, either right 
after issuance or perhaps as a more distant effective date approaches, there are good 
reasons for allowing the agency to make revisions without using the initial rule as a 
baseline to measure the permissibility of change.  At this early stage in the life of the rule, 
the agency ought to be able to re-shape the rule in any way that would have been 
supportable based on the original rulemaking record.  In addition to preserving a measure 
of flexibility, this would also have a desirable procedural effect.  The Supreme Court 
adverted to the “inherent advantages of informal rulemaking” when it rejected the 
argument that courts have the power to require additional procedures in complicated or 
important rulemaking proceedings.26  Flexibility in the immediate post-notice and 
                                                 
26 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
547 (1978) 
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comment period would allow an agency to issue a rule after a single notice and comment 
period knowing that if the rule provokes an unanticipated outcry, revisions supportable 
under the original record could still be made.  Without this flexibility, agencies might be 
more reluctant to make desirable revisions if that would require a new notice and 
comment period and greater justification.  They might be more cautious during the initial 
rulemaking proceeding, perhaps by adding a second notice and comment period if there is 
any perceived likelihood that a rule will provoke a strong negative reaction.  While some 
people might think more notice and comment would be a good thing, the Supreme 
Court’s preference is to follow Congress’s model of a short and sweet notice and 
comment process.27
 
B. Alternative Statutory Possibilities. 
 
Assuming that the Supreme Court declines the invitation to build a solution for the 
midnight regulation problem into administrative law, another possibility is for Congress 
to create a statutory solution along the lines of Representative Nadler’s proposal but 
without the defects of that particular bill.  The key would be to design a proposal that 
discouraged the outgoing administration from engaging in midnight rulemaking or gave 
the incoming administration effective tools to deal with it or both. 
 
Despite its limitations, Representative Nadler’s bill could serve as the basis for a better 
proposal if the problems identified with it in the first section of this Article were 
                                                 
27 Id.  See generally Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Gw. L. Rev. 856 
(2007). 
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remedied.  Most of the problems with the bill would be solved with a few simple 
changes.  1. The bill should define midnight rules as final rules adopted by an agency in 
the 90 days before Inauguration Day, i.e. October 22 through January 20 in election 
years.  “Adopted” should be defined as something like “finalized and sent to the Federal 
Register for publication as required by law.”  These changes would clarify the timing 
issues—the bill should apply only to presidential transitions in election years, and 
whether a bill is a midnight rule should depend on when it is finalized by the agency head 
and put in the queue for publication in the Federal Register.   
 
2. The bill should give the incoming administration the option to suspend midnight rules 
for a certain period after Inauguration Day, perhaps 60 days, rather than suspend all 
midnight rules automatically.  If the incoming administration takes no action within the 
60 day period, the rules should go into effect as adopted.  This avoids the uncertainty of 
tying the time period to the appointment of a new agency head, which may not happen at 
all if the incoming administration is of the same party or if there are holdovers from the 
prior administration, or for a long time if there is a delay in naming or confirming an 
incoming agency head.  Making action optional with the new administration is preferable 
to a blanket automatic suspension because it allows the incoming administration to focus 
its attention on issues it finds important.  This could have the negative effect of forcing 
the incoming administration to examine all midnight rules quickly, but it seems to be a 
better alternative than a blanket suspension.  This preference is based partly on the 
perhaps naïve hope that future administrations will seek to avoid midnight rulemaking as 
consciousness of the problem increases. 
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3. The incoming administration should have the option to alter as well as disapprove 
midnight rules, assuming that the alteration would be supported by the original 
rulemaking record.  If the agency finds it advisable to make changes beyond those 
supportable under the original rulemaking record, the agency should have the power to 
suspend a midnight rule to allow the time to conduct a new rulemaking proceeding.  
Under Representative Nadler’s proposal, review is an all-or-nothing proposition.  This 
ignores the possibility that the incoming administration will find only some of the 
features of a midnight rule objectionable.  It is easy to imagine the incoming 
administration objecting only to a limited number of features of a large midnight rule, 
and there is no reason for not allowing amendments rather than wholesale rejection.  
Because of the fear that midnight rules may be undesirable due to hasty drafting and 
excessive interest group involvement, the incoming administration should have the time 
to conduct a new rulemaking if it decides one is necessary, without the midnight rule 
going into effect.  Administrations have done this without specific authorization.  For 
example, the Clinton administration suspended the abortion gag rule in its first week in 
office and did not promulgate a substitute until its last year in office.28  It would be better 
if the incoming administration acted with statutory authority rather than create a situation 
of doubt and potential costly litigation.   
 
4. “Agency” should be defined in the bill to include only Executive Branch agencies and 
not independent agencies that are less subject to presidential control.  The worst dangers 
of midnight regulation relate virtually exclusively to the politics of the presidential 
                                                 
28 See Beermann, supra note x at 963-64. 
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transition.  As explained above, because independent agencies are not subject to much if 
any presidential control, midnight rules issued by them are less likely to be designed to 
embarrass or hinder the incoming administration or to project an administration’s policies 
into the future.  Further, “midnight” at an independent agency may come later, when 
expiring terms or impending resignations shift control of the agency to members of the 
new President’s party.  It would be very difficult and probably unnecessary to write a 
statute that identified the proper time during which an independent agency’s rulemaking 
activity should be curtailed due to the possibility of midnight regulation. 
 
5. Rules not subject to notice and comment should not be included in any midnight rule 
reform, mainly because the incoming administration could very easily alter any such 
midnight rule under current law.29  If an outgoing agency issues a policy statement or 
interpretive rule in its waning moments, the incoming agency can simply issue a new rule 
without delay.  While this would have some of the negative effects of midnight regulation 
discussed above, the lack of substantive effect and the ease of rescission or amendment 
make midnight interpretive rules and policy statements a much less serious problem than 
midnight legislative rules.  
 
In addition to the above proposals which are designed to cure the defects in 
Representative Nadler’s approach, another statutory possibility would be to enact a more 
                                                 
29 There are two sets of exceptions to the APA’s notice and comment requirements.  First, the APA 
rulemaking provision does not apply to rules involving military and foreign affairs functions and rules 
relating to “agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.”  5 
U.S.C. § 553(a).  The notice and comment provisions of the rulemaking provision does not apply to 
“interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”  
5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  Publication requirements may still apply.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). 
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general reform to deal with the administrative law issues identified in section A above.  A 
provision could be crafted that would give all agencies the power to revise or rescind 
rules shortly after adoption to provide for revisions based on midnight regulation 
problems or simply second thoughts after promulgation even in the absence of a 
transition in administrations.30  This provision could, for example, give all agencies the 
power to revise or rescind rules within 90 days of adoption without a new rulemaking 
proceeding if the new rule (or no rule at all) would have been supported adequately by 
the original rulemaking record.  This provision has two virtues—it is simpler than one 
focused on the midnight rulemaking problem and it increases regulatory flexibility in all 
periods, transition or not. 
 
Another simpler proposal that might be considered is to ban outright the adoption of final 
rules by Executive Branch agencies for a period of time prior to Inauguration Day, for 
example 120 days, with exceptions for rules required by emergency, statutory deadline or 
court order.  This possibility has several virtues. For one, it would reduce the load that 
incoming administrations currently bears—there would be few or no midnight regulations 
to sift through since all regulations would have been finalized longer before election day 
than is currently the case.  While this reform might be viewed as an empty gesture since it 
would merely move up the deadline, in effect changing the clock and making midnight 
come a few months early in election years has the additional virtue of placing all late-
                                                 
30 A statue to this effect may have led the D.C. Circuit to allow President George W. Bush’s Department of 
Energy to act against the last-minute rule issued by Clinton administration concerning the energy efficiency 
of central air condition and heat pumps that the D.C. Circuit held the Bush administration could not revise 
in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004).  It is unclear whether this 
statutory reform would override the anti-backsliding provision of the statute at issue in Abraham, but in 
most situations it would allow agencies to adjust their rules for a brief period after issuance.
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term rules in the sunshine of the public record long enough before election day for the 
public to be made aware of them.  This should discourage many midnight rules that 
appear to be farewell gifts to interest groups.  It would, however, not allow cooperation 
between incoming and outgoing administrations in my “waiting category” within which a 
cooperative outgoing administration clears away difficult issues late in the term as an aid 
to the incoming administration.  Further, the ban would apply even when it would not be 
necessary, for example when an incumbent is reelected or when the new President is of 
the same party as the prior President.  It also assumes the worst—that all outgoing 
administrations are behaving badly rather than carrying on the business of government to 
the end perhaps even in consultation with the incoming administration.  An outgoing 
President might decide to take the high road and not allow the impending stroke of 
midnight to influence administrative action.  In such cases, the work of career agency 
employees could needlessly be slowed to a crawl every four years around election time. 
  
III. Conclusion 
 
Recent research confirms that midnight regulation has long been a feature of the 
transition between administrations.31  There seems to be a general view that midnight 
regulation is an illegitimate vehicle for projecting an outgoing administration’s policy 
agenda beyond the end of its term.  For this and additional reasons for disfavoring 
midnight regulation, Representative Jerrold Nadler’s proposed Midnight Rule Act is a 
step in the right direction.  With refinements discussed above, it might prevent some of 
                                                 
31 See Antony Davies & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations: An Update, Mercatus Center Working 
Paper (2008) (copy on file with author). 
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the most egregious examples of midnight regulation.  Reforms to administrative law, or 
simpler proposals that simply suspend rulemaking activity at the end of each presidential 
term, might accomplish the same goal.  This article has outlined and analyzed these 
various possibilities with the hope of enhancing the understanding of ways of combating 
midnight regulation. 
